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POLITICALLY CORRECT HATE SPEECH
The purpose of this paper is to present a brief discussion of selected 
aspects of incriminating hate speech in Poland, first focusing on how the 
perception of speech acts and the rules of precaution adopted in Polish soci-
ety in this regard translate into criminal lability for hate speech, and then 
on the effectiveness of both the penal measures and the attempted Euro-
pean harmonization in this area. Within the scope of such a short report 
it is of course not possible to touch on all the hate speech issues associated 
with criminal law. Presenting an in-depth study on this topic would require 
a separate monograph and empirical case research on the application of 
current penal provisions in what could be qualified as ‘hate speech cases’. 
Such a study could support or challenge the presumption that this applica-
tion is far from satisfactory. The aim of the following short article is to pres-
ent some explanations for, and aspects of, the problems that might arise 
in the context of criminalizing the special form of human behaviour that is 
constituted by speech, rather than action,1 and which might emerge in the 
process of executing the relevant provisions; and to consider how attitudes 
in society towards what can be expressed and what can be said translate 
into criminal liability. 
Before going into details, some preliminary points require clarification. 
First of all, the term ‘hate speech’ is not used in Polish law, and it lacks a le-
gal definition. It is relatively new to the Polish doctrine of criminal law but is 
quite often used in public debate and in numerous non-juridical contexts. The 
non-juridical definitions are subsequently quoted by both courts and schol-
ars. Thus, though it still seldom appears in the commentaries to the Criminal 
Code, ‘hate speech’ becomes a term rooted in the judicial language and is more 
and more present in jurisprudence. 
Secondly, obviously the phenomenon of hate speech has a significantly 
broader context than just the legal one, hence we differentiate between 
acts of hate speech as such (the use of language of contempt, disdain and 
scorn), and the crime of hate speech. Analogously, we separate ‘hate crime’ 
from ‘hate incidents’ (which are not crimes). Hate speech in the broad sense 
is understood as any statement present in the public sphere which is in-
sulting and/or degrading, or the content of which content incites hatred 
towards someone because of their belonging to a specific group (for example 
1 On the differences between speech and action see, e.g. Schauer (2015): 427–454. 
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sexual minorities). In a narrow sense, it is speech penalized by criminal 
sanctions.2
In the Polish Criminal Code (CC), there are several provisions that deal 
with various forms of language of contempt. The most important in this re-
gard are: Article 256 CC, according to which anyone who publicly incites ha-
tred based on national, ethnic, race or religious differences, or for not being 
religious, is liable to punishment; and Article 257 CC, which prohibits ‘public 
insult to a group of people or a particular person because of their national, eth-
nic, racial, religious affiliation or because of their lack of religion.’ However, 
Articles 119,3 126a,4 and 2555 CC are also worth mentioning. 
With regard to their wording, the relevant regulations seem to comply 
with the European standards and guarantee the scope of criminal protection 
against the ‘words that wound’ desired by the European legislator. This may 
lead us to the conclusion that Polish legislation meets the obligations result-
ing from the Council Framework Decision on combating certain forms and ex-
pressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law 2008/913/JHA of 
28 November 2008. But the observation of public and private life and disputes, 
supported by various reports and statistics, shows that this compliance is to 
a certain extent illusory. And this, as we shall see, is not necessarily our fault. 
The cited framework decision sets out the common rules for combating 
racist and xenophobic offences in all Member States by means of criminal law. 
Its purpose is to define ‘a common criminal law approach in the European 
Union to the phenomenon of racism and xenophobia, in order to ensure that 
the same behaviour constitutes an offence in all Member States.’ It is an in-
strument similar to, for example, the Framework Decision on combating cor-
ruption in the private sector, the directives on the protection of the euro and 
other currencies, and on the protection of the environment through criminal 
law. But what makes it special and difficult to apply is the nature of the be-
haviour it is aimed at restricting, namely certain forms of speech. 
The particularity of human expression as a behaviour being subject to 
criminal evaluation implies that divergent views are held by society and the 
judicial authorities of different Member States with regard to determining 
2 E.g. Rogalska, Urbańczyk (2017): 119–120; Other definitions can be found in: Kowalski, 
Tulli (2001); Łodziński (2003): 5; Gliszczyńska, Sękowska-Kozłowska, Wieruszewski (2007); Czyk- 
win (2007): 375.
3 Article 119 CC: ‘§ 1. Whoever uses force or an unlawful threat towards a group of people 
or an individual person because of their national, ethnic, racial, political or religious affiliation or 
lack of religious affiliation, is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for between 3 months 
and 5 years.’
4 Article 126a CC: ‘Whoever publicly incites others to commit the act provided for in arts. 
118, 118a, 119 § 1, arts. 120–125 or publicly extols the commission of the act provided for in those 
provisions, is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for between 3 months and 5 years.’
5 Article 255 § 1 CC: ‘Whoever publicly incites others to commit a misdemeanour or a fiscal 
crime, is subject to a fine, the penalty of limitation of liberty or the penalty of deprivation of liberty 
for up to 2 years. § 2. Whoever publicly incites others to commit a felony, is subject to the penalty 
of deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years. § 3. Whoever publicly exhorts the commission of a crime, 
is subject to a fine in the amount of up to 180 daily rates, the penalty of limitation of liberty or the 
penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to one year.’
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what acts can be qualified as expressing something that can be classified as 
incitement or hatred and, in turn, which acts can constitute a crime.6 Current-
ly, it does not seem possible, or is extremely difficult, to guarantee the same 
scope of incrimination and safeguard a similar level of protection against hate 
speech in the multicultural environment of the EU. Irrespective of any at-
tempts at legal harmonization, the same speech act can and will be legally 
evaluated differently in the different cultural contexts of various EU coun-
tries, not necessary in the way envisioned by the European legislator. 
The divergences originate in the very nature of speech and in what we 
consider criminal behaviour – that is, behaviour requiring a sanction and re-
pression that satisfies the common sense of justice. In the Polish criminal law 
system, a crime is constituted by five elements: an act that is prohibited by the 
law in force at the time of its perpetration; and that is unlawful, socially harm-
ful and culpable.7 The core of this structure is the prohibited act, that is, an act 
of a natural person, whose features, objective and subjective character traits, 
have been defined by the law.8 In this context it is, of course, crucial to deter-
mine what an ‘act’ is, in terms of what part of human behaviour constitutes 
a separate unit that can undergo criminal evaluation. There are of course var-
ious theories on this issue, and the problem remains largely unsolved: it is still 
difficult to speak of a persuasive opinion that could be treated as prevailing. 
However, what is important for our deliberations is that in recent years 
legal scholars, and the courts to some extent, have brought into focus an ad-
ditional, special criterion for considering a human act as prohibited – in other 
words, the precondition of due cautiousness. One can say that now it is ac-
knowledged that the primary requirement for qualifying a behaviour as a pro-
hibited act is surpassing the so called ‘rules of caution’.9 
Precautionary rules are understood as generally accepted rules of proceed-
ing with a given good, aimed at securing this good against damage. Although 
the exact place of those rules in the structure of crime is still an issue that is 
subject to discussion, the prevailing position is that only a form of behaviour 
that we consider as not cautious or risky, not in line with the rules of conduct, 
can constitute an intentionally or unintentionally committed prohibited act 
and, subsequently, a crime.10 If someone acts cautiously in a given situation, 
for instance they drive at the minimum appropriate speed, they cannot breach 
any norm that would forbid them to (intentionally or unintentionally) act this 
way (the so-called sanctioned norm). And only the infringement of this norm 
would justify a criminal sanction (the use of a sanctioning norm). In common 
law, exercising due diligence may release one from strict liability. Analogously 
(as of course we do not have such liability in terms of criminal liability) in our 
system it is possible to counter charges of committing a criminal offence by 
referring to the precaution rules. 
 6 See, e.g.: Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, Rachlinski (2012): 851–902.
 7 E.g. Zawłocki (2013): 102.
 8 Wróbel, Zoll (2013): 27, 189. 
 9 Wróbel, Zoll (2013): 174. 
10 Byczyk (2016): 26; Królikowski (2010): 148–150.
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Those precaution rules have a prescriptive but not normative nature, in 
the sense that they are not norms of law.11 To some extent they are confirmed 
and included in legislative acts, but it is not those acts that are their source. 
They have not been catalogued anywhere, are open in nature, and are of di-
verse provenance. They follow non-legislative normative orders – moral, so-
cial, customary or religious norms, or relate to categories of ‘common sense’ 
based on observations of social life.12 Generally speaking, they rely on our 
current knowledge about the world, and need to be specified and adjusted to 
given conditions depending not only on objective aspects of the situation, but 
also – to some extent – on the personal characteristics of the acting person: 
we can expect different behaviour from someone with so-called ‘special knowl-
edge’ than from an average person.13 
What is very important in this regard is that in case of natural behaviour, 
those rules are mostly based on natural causation and our present, empirical 
understanding of the laws of nature, for example we know that a fast-moving 
car will not stop immediately and will hit and consequently damage another 
object standing in its way, hence we have a rule that forbids driving too fast, 
we know that if a bullet hits a person it will cause either their death or other 
serious damage, hence shooting bullets is basically considered incautious. One 
can say those rules are international and commonly shared by different soci-
eties, irrespective of their cultural setting. The laws of physics are universal. 
However, in the case of speech acts there nothing like natural causation. What 
we perceive as a speech act, what meaning we assign to this speech, and what 
perlocutionary effect it can induce, is only a derivative of our cultural expe-
rience. It is a product of the interpretations imposed on us, as members of 
certain interpretative communities.14 That is why the guidelines on what is 
cautious and what is hazardous in speech, indicating when a natural act of 
a person should be understood as an expression conveying a specific meaning, 
are based only on the practices and strategies adopted by a certain society 
with a particular cultural background. The rules of precaution are local, based 
on our cultural experience, and thus vary depending on the characteristics of 
the society.
One may say that the conclusion that culture determines how law func-
tions is an obvious one – since law by itself is a product of culture.15 The cre-
ation of law is determined by culture and so of course is the application of 
legal provisions. What is important in this regard is that in the case of speech, 
including hate speech, it not only influences the understanding of law in books 
and the interpretation of given legal provisions, but also the process of estab-
lishing ‘what happened’ and whether there was a hazardous act. 
In this respect, it is one thing to establish by means of interpretation if 
something has been expressed, and what has been said, and another thing 
11 Byczyk (2016): 236.
12 Wróbel, Zoll (2013): 174.
13 Królikowski (2010): 149–150, 174, 236.
14 Demenko (2017): 27; see also Fish (1998): 141–162.
15 Petrażycki (1968): 44. 
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entirely to evaluate if what has been said infringes the local rules of precau-
tion in a given situation. Calling someone a Jew might in certain societies be 
(rightly or wrongly) perceived as normal behaviour, falling within what is con-
sidered acceptable, whereas in another it might be seen as very inappropriate, 
and consequently as harmful. Even the use of words regarded as obscene must 
not necessarily always be considered as risky – if in a given interpretative 
community it is recognized as normal to use obscene words in certain situa-
tions. In this regard we must rely on what is customary and, consequently, 
what is socially acceptable.
In Poland it seems that customs allow a great deal – the language of con-
tempt, hate speech in its broader meaning, is nowadays perceived as some-
thing almost immanent to public debate. There are numerous examples from 
social media where politicians and columnists use words which might not ex-
actly qualify as hate speech in the strict sense, but are commonly considered 
as vulgar, insulting or slandering. To provide some examples: Janusz Palikot, 
former MP and deputy leader of the opposition party Civic Platform, called 
a journalist and former politician Magdalena Ogórek ‘a whore’ on Twitter; 
Radosław Sikorski, a former Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, told 
a member of the Polish Press Agency ‘get lost whacko’; the conservative jour-
nalist Rafał Ziemkiewicz called the Mayor of Gdańsk ‘a pathetic idiot’ who 
‘supports those whose only purpose is to shit on Polish doormats and spit in 
the soup’; Senator Grzegorz Bierecki (from the ruling Law and Justice party) 
stated in an official speech that ‘We will not stop until we have fully purged 
Poland of people who are not dignified enough to belong to our national com-
munity’; and the leader of the largest opposition party, Grzegorz Schetyna, 
said ‘We must win…remove the Law and Justice locust from the healthy tree 
of our country.’16
This ‘environment’ obviously influences the way we speak, and the mean-
ings and senses we attribute to the words we use. Phrases originally char-
acterized by contempt and carrying a negative emotional charge, such as: 
‘treacherous mugs’ (an insult thrown from the parliamentary floor by Jarosław 
Kaczyński towards political opponents), and ‘slaughter a pack’ (statement by 
Radosław Sikorski during a convention), are now common in colloquial speech. 
These are just some random examples of words spoken by high-ranking 
officials. Every day a new portion of that kind of language is served to soci-
ety though the mass media – traditional and new, public and private. And 
they do not come from only a single political environment. The ongoing po-
litical dispute between the two largest political parties and their supporters 
(including commentators and journalists) seems to have been exempted from 
responsibility for speech acts. Insults and verbal abuse from one side seem to 
justify and excuse the same level of insults from the other. In this regard, one 
may of course note that there is a difference between hate speech and speech 
that is only impolite, tasteless or vulgar. It is in any case true, if we perceive 
hate speech in the strict sense of its meaning, if we consider hate speech as 
16 See also Wiśniewska (2010): 249–262; Maszkowski (2020): 263–280.
Anna Demenko, Michał Urbańczyk174
speech that is ‘only’ degrading and insulting, the line between unjust verbal 
discrimination and impoliteness becomes blurry. And we still need to bear in 
mind the broken window theory, which might be relevant in this context, to 
some extent – accustoming society with ‘just’ tasteless statements can lead to 
increasingly offensive language. 
The deterioration of the language of public debate in Poland seems not to 
be restricted or hindered by the – in this regard crucial – concept of political 
correctness, understood as the principle of avoiding terms that could be con-
sidered as a manifestation of discrimination (against persons on the grounds 
of their race, nationality, religion, social origin or sexual orientation).17 This, 
of course, can be attributed to various reasons. 
First of all, Poland after WW II was not a multicultural society in which 
minorities required protection.18 Thus, the concept of political correctness to 
safeguard their interests did not seem necessary. Secondly, in the Polish tra-
dition of law and its application, the freedom of expression was valued much 
higher than other goods. In the period before the Partitions of Poland, it was 
an exclusive right of the gentry, but ‘the gentry could use it in an almost un-
limited way’. Freedom of public speaking was restricted only with regard to 
religious matters, and in the event of an attack on the honour and dignity of 
another nobleman, however even the monarch was not free from criticism – 
there was a distinction between the monarch embodying the majesty of the 
Republic and the person of the monarch himself, who could be imperfect. In 
practice, members of parliament and regional assemblies had the right to 
speak in a completely free and unrestricted manner.19 This broadly under-
stood right to freedom of expression was confirmed as libertas sentiendi by the 
Four-Year Sejm on 5 January 1791.20 Freedom of speech, especially political 
expressions in the public arena, preserved its exceptional importance after 
Poland regained independence in 1918. Representatives of the intellectual 
elite of the time believed that political statements had to have guarantees 
of protection against restrictions, and politicians had to get used to what we 
would call today hate speech, in a broad sense. The regulations on freedom 
of expression ‘were applied with great leniency to the authors of statements. 
Words addressed to citizens in the press, during rallies called by members 
of parliament in the election period or in the term of office, and finally from 
pulpits, were accusatory in tone and often served to discredit the opponent.’21 
This led us to a situation in which the language of the Polish public debate 
appears to be very open and free compared to Western countries. Thus, it is 
almost politically correct to be incorrect. As has already been mentioned, such 
17 For concepts of political correctness see, e.g. Huges (2010): 3–60. 
18 Due to the immigration process this cultural homogeneousness seems to be changing in 
the last years.
19 Lewandowska-Malec (2013): 27–28.
20 Mrozek (2013): 282. An important aspect contributing to the broad freedom of speech was 
also the lack of a single censorship office and conflicts of competence between the Krakow Acade-
my (the first Polish University) and church authorities. This significantly weakened the impor-
tance of the printing privileges. Sobczak (2009): 55. 
21 Lewandowska-Malec (2013): 18, 29–30. 
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openness impacts our understanding of precaution in terms of speech acts 
and, in consequence, partly determines our understanding of criminal behav-
iour and hate speech that requires penal sanctions.22 
This results in the peculiar permissiveness of the Polish investigative 
and judicial authorities towards hate speech.23 Though a definite thesis in 
this regard would require an in-depth case study, the experiences of various 
NGOs engaged in combating hate speech indicate that the application of the 
above-mentioned provisions of the criminal code leaves much to be desired.24 
Judicial leniency towards acts that should be qualified as hate speech in the 
strict sense can be explained through the rules of precaution. Our caution 
about what might be said and expressed is just a conventional product, and 
the political, official culture of debate is transmitted into the rules also govern-
ing the private sphere. Put simply, if ministers are not prosecuted for using 
offensive and degrading language, because it is not perceived by society (in-
cluding the judge) to be a hazardous act that can constitute a crime or petty of-
fence, neither will average Joe Public. Consequently, it appears we enjoy more 
freedom of speech than the so-called traditional democracies in the sense that 
it is allowed to use a more offensive language and thus it is easier to express 
discriminating, biased attitudes. But this does not come from any deliberate 
valuation of freedoms (as in the US legal doctrine) or observance of human 
rights, but from a simple reluctance to any form of censorship, ensuing from 
our historic experience and from the lack of responsibility for spoken words, 
which according to Article 10(2) of the European convention on human rights, 
is a crucial element of the freedom of expression. 
This is not only a specific Polish problem – if we looked into what is per-
ceived as protected speech and as criminal speech by the societies and judicial 
authorities of various European countries, we would receive very different 
responses. Reaching the same or similar scope of criminalization, ensuring 
that the same behaviour constitutes an offence in all Member States, will not 
be possible without forming common standards and rules of cautiousness in 
regard to hazardous language, without cultural integration and the creation 
of common interpretative communities. First and foremost, it calls for the har-
monization of social sensitivity. The question is: can this be achieved by legal 
means? The answer is yes and no. On the one hand, of course one cannot 
ignore the regulatory function of legal provisions as such. On the other hand, 
we must remember that any attempts at introducing restrictions that are not 
welcome or seem to be unnecessary in the society can be counterproductive.25 
And in that regard speech is quite special – the best way to describe the re-
striction is to say exactly that what is forbidden, and thus to re-enact the 
undesired behaviour. If we want to inform somebody that saying ‘Mr Jones 
is a thief’ is penalized, we will have to say the forbidden words. However, 
22 As to the perception of hate speech in society see Bilewicz et al. (2014). 
23 See the ‘incidents database’ at <http://zglosnienawisc.otwarta.org/?lang=en> administered 
by the NGO “Otwarta Rzeczpospolita” Association against Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia.
24 Ibidem.
25 Demenko (2019): 87–98; Cegła (2013): 57–70.
Anna Demenko, Michał Urbańczyk176
this does not mean that we should do nothing. Legislative instruments need 
to be supported by non-legal means and education, in a broad sense. Some 
examples show that such an unforced change of attitude might occur. And 
here is a Polish example of this process – in the 1990s the use of the word 
‘Murzyn’ was considered neutral.26 Today it is rather perceived as negative, 
as an equivalent of the English N-word, and is often replaced by the words 
‘czarny’, ‘czarnoskóry’ (black), ‘afroamerykański’ (African-American) or ‘afry-
kański’ (African). This shift, of course, did not result from ay historical expe-
rience, but from certain general trends coming from outside. Not because of 
law, but because of a changing global perspective. Combating hate speech just 
by imposed legal means will not be effective, at least not in the long run. We 
should rather look into the reasons behind such speech and the local sensitivi-
ty, not forgetting that to some extent it will be justified to treat it also as kind 
of a security request.27 
Anna Demenko 
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POLITICALLY CORRECT HATE SPEECH
S u m m a r y
In the paper we discuss the reasons behind a specific permissiveness of the Polish judicial author-
ities with regard to hate speech. Hate speech is criminalized by various provisions of the Polish 
Criminal Code. But as conducted surveys and statistics show, these regulations do not seem to 
be used adequately. The acceptance of hate speech does not necessarily result from the fact that 
we are a less tolerant society, but also to a large extent, from the fact that the scope of what is 
allowed to be said, especially publicly, is in Poland very broad. Paradoxically, it seems that in this 
‘new democracy’ there is more freedom of speech than in Western countries, where political cor-
rectness plays a very important role in public and social life. The lack of responsibility that goes 
with freedom of speech and of boundaries on what might be expressed in public, the scurrilous 
language used also by high-ranking officials, influence the rules of socially acceptable behaviour. 
These rules also influence the scope of what is considered criminal behaviour. When tackling the 
problem of the acceptance of hate speech, it is also very important to remember that legal acts, 
especially criminal law, might not necessarily be the best way to change the attitudes in a society. 
Restrictions on freedom of speech might not only have a freezing effect but also be counterproduc-
tive – that which it is prohibited to say tends to be said more. The problem is to strike the right 
balance between those two possible outcomes.
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